[1]    On August 15, 1996, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (the "Minister") gave notice to Vladimir Katriuk (the "respondent"), a Canadian Citizen, that it was her intention to request that the Governor in Council revoke his citizenship. The notice reads, in part, as follows:

AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that if you do not so request, the said report will be made to the Governor in Council without further notice or delay.

[2]    On August 27, 1996, the respondent, pursuant to paragraph 18.1(a) of the Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 29, as amended, wrote to the Minister requesting that she refer the matter of the revocation of his citizenship to the Federal Court of Canada. On October 31, 1996, the Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the Minister, referred the matter to this Court. By his proceedings, the Attorney General seeks a declaration from this Court that the respondent obtained his Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances.

[3]    I will begin with a brief outline of the relevant facts. The story which follows is that put forward by the respondent. The respondent is of Ukrainian ancestry. He was born on October 1, 1921 in the Village of Luzhany, near the City of Chernovsty. In 1921, Chernovsty was situated in an area known as Bukovina which was then part of Romania.

[4]    After completing Grade 6, the respondent commenced an apprenticeship in the meat packing trade in Chernovsty for a period of three years (1935 to 1938). For the next two and one half years, he worked in a meat factory returning to his village shortly before the arrival of troops from the Soviet Union in 1940. The Soviet troops arrived to occupy Bukovina following the pact entered into between Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1939. The Soviet occupation lasted until Germany invaded the newly created regions of the Soviet Union in June of 1941. Shortly thereafter, German troops arrived in Bukovina with their Hungarian and Romanian allies.

[5]    Neither the Soviet nor the German occupation was pleasant for the local Ukranian inhabitants. Professor Orest Subtelny in Ukraine A History, 2^nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), at 453, offers a vivid description of the plight of the Ukrainians during that period:

From the Ukrainian point of view, the Second World War took place in two distinct phases. The initial phase began on 1 September 1938 when the Germans attacked Poland and the Soviets occupied its eastern territories soon after. The main feature of this stage, which involved only the West Ukrainians, was the appearance in their lands of new occupying powers, the foremost of these being the Soviets. The second phase, which will be discussed later, commenced with the German invasion of the USSR on 22 June 1941 and lasted until the Soviet expulsion of German troops from Ukraine in the fall of 1944. This phase encompassed all of Ukraine and exposed its inhabitants to the worst horrors of the war.

[6]    In the fall of 1941, the respondent, like many of his Ukrainian compatriots from Bukovina, joined a volunteer force which marched to Kiev to, amongst other things, liberate that city, and hence liberate Ukraine. The march to Kiev took a number of months. The Bukovinians arrived in Kiev in November or December of 1941. In due course, the Germans who were occupying Kiev, after a brief period of coexistence with Ukrainian nationalists, decided that Ukrainian nationalism would not be tolerated in the occupied territories. As a result, many of the leaders of the Ukrainian National Movement were either arrested or executed.

[7]    The Germans then proceeded to form battalions in which different nationals, including Ukrainians, would serve Germany. The first battalion to be formed was Battalion 115, of which the respondent became a member. All members of Battalion 115 were Ukrainians. Subsequently, before the end of 1942, the Germans formed Battalion 118. Approximately 100 men from Battalion 115, including the respondent, were taken to form Battalion 118. The third company of Battalion 115 became the first company of Battalion 118. Prisoners of war captured by the Germans from the retreating Soviet armies were also recruited into this battalion. They became the second and third companies of Battalion 118. The Battalion was formed of about 500 men divided between three companies each of which was divided into three platoons. In turn, each platoon was composed of a number of units of ten to thirteen men. The respondent was a member of the first platoon of the first company of Battalion 118 and was made a sergeant in charge of a unit. Battalion 118 was led by Ukrainian officers under the overall command of German officers.

[8]    At the end of 1942, the men of Battalion 118 were taken in trucks to the City of Minsk in Byelorussia. From Minsk, the battalion was sent to Pleshchenitsi. Following its stay in Pleshchenitsi, the battalion went to Evye, a Polish village, where the battalion remained for approximately one year, i.e. from the spring of 1943 to the time of the Russian advance in the spring of 1944.

[9]    With respect to the battalion"s activities while in Kiev, Minsk, Pleshchenitsi and Evye, the respondent, in his statement filed in response to the Minister"s summary of facts and evidence, gave the following explanation:

[10]    In his viva voce evidence, the respondent reiterated the above statements. He testified that he had never participated in any major military operation and that he had never fired his gun in Pleshchenitsi and Evye. The respondent"s testimony was that his company"s involvement was to protect civilians against enemy partisans. The respondent stated that he had heard of German operations which took place in 1943 but that his company had not participated in these operations.

[11]    As the Russian army advanced in the Spring of 1944, the German troops, including Battalions 115 and 118, began their retreat towards the West. At some point during the retreat, i.e. somewhere in what was then East Prussia, Battalions 115 and 118 were merged into one battalion. According to the respondent, the newly created battalion would have had approximately 500 to 600 men.

[12]    In August of 1944, the men of the new battalion were transported by train to Bésançon, France. From there, they were taken to Valderharn, a small village where German anti-aircraft forces were stationed in large barracks built during Napoleon"s rule. The members of the new battalion were informed by their German officers that they would now be part of the Waffen S.S. 30^th Grenadier Division.

[13]    Following their arrival at Valderharn, some members of the new battalion made contact with the French underground and, in particular, with what was then known as the Forces Françaises de l"Intérieur ("FFI"). One day, the respondent and his companions were informed by German officers that they would be fighting the allies on the following day. According to the respondent, he and his companions were waiting for an opportunity to join the French underground and, consequently, that evening, a majority of the men of the battalion defected to the French partisans.

[14]    As part of the FFI, the respondent and his colleagues fought on a number of occasions against German troops. They were, in due course, sent to the front to fight against Germany. While they were fighting at the front, Soviet officers came to visit them with a request that they return to the "motherland". The respondent did not want to return to Russia as he feared he would be sent to Siberia for a long period of time. As a result of Soviet pressure, the respondent and his colleagues were removed from the front and sent to the village of Dumblair where they remained for a few days. Their weapons were taken from them and the French informed them they would have to return to Russia. After discussing the matter with French officers, they were informed that the only way they could avoid being sent back to Russia was to join the French Foreign Legion ("FFL"). The respondent joined the FFL as did many of his colleagues.

[15]    The respondent was taken by train to Marseille in order to enroll in the FFL. According to the respondent, 100 to 120 men of the merged battalions decided to return to the Soviet Union.

[16]    The respondent officially joined the FFL in September 1944 as a private. He was one of twenty to twenty-five "volunteers" who were asked by their French commanders to go to the front to fight the German army. At the front, the respondent was placed in charge of a machine gun and, during the course of his participation, was severely injured. He spent two and one half months in an American hospital in France.

[17]    In 1945, the respondent again fought with the allies, this time at the Italian front near Monaco. It was during this period of time that the Second World War came to an end. The respondent was taken from Italy to Nice, France where he rested and was then taken to barracks near Paris (at Meaux) where FFL troops were to be reorganized so as to be sent to Indochina.

[18]    At Meaux, the respondent fell under the command of a Spanish sergeant. His relationship with his commanding officer was very poor and, as a result, his commanding officer informed him that it was doubtful that he would return alive from Indochina were he would shortly be sent.

[19]    This threat occurred about three days before the 15^th of July 1945 parade to commemorate the liberation of Paris. The respondent was given a month"s leave and he travelled to Paris and, while there, contacted members of the French underground that he had met during the war. He informed them of his problem with his commanding officer in the FFL and asked for new identity papers in the name of Nicolas Schpirka, his brother-in-law. At that time, his sister and brother-in-law were still living in the respondent"s home village in Bukovina. The respondent"s evidence is that he changed his name because he had deserted the FFL and, if caught, would have been shot. The papers which the respondent obtained showed his birth date to be January 1921 instead of October 1921. He chose January as his birth month because his brother-in-law was born in the month of January. It took several months before the respondent obtained his papers in the name of Schpirka. Needless to say, the respondent did not return to the FFL at the end of his leave.

[20]    The respondent took his new identity papers to the municipality of Paris and was issued a "carte d"invité" valid for three months. In due course, his "carte d"invité" was renewed for a period of ten years. He then started looking for a job and found one as a butcher for a small company where he worked for approximately ten months. The respondent then found a better paying job, again as a butcher, and remained at this new job for approximately two years following which he and two partners started a business.

[21]    One of his partners was a Frenchman that he had met at his second job and together they found a third partner, an Ukrainian from Bukovina, Ivan Serbyn. Their business was a wholesale delicatessen operation, selling headcheese, hams, sausages, etc.. At one point in time, the business had eighteen employees. Because of French laws, neither Mr. Serbyn, nor the respondent, as foreigners, could own the business and therefore their wives were the legal owners.

[22]    The respondent met his future wife at the end of 1945 or in the early months of 1946. Maria Stéphanie Kavoom, a French citizen, lived in Paris in the 6e Arrondissement. She was born in Troyes, France on February 3, 1927. Her parents were Ukrainians who had immigrated to France in 1924. The respondent and his wife were married in Paris on February 10, 1948. Maria Stéphanie Kavoom became Maria Stéphanie Schpirka.

[23]    Although the Schpirkas had no particular reason to come to Canada, they decided to take steps to come to this country after receiving a letter of invitation from Mr. and Mrs. Rohosky, Ukrainians friends whom they had met in Paris and who had immigrated to Canada. The Rohoskys had come to France from Switzerland. In their letter of invitation, the Rohoskys informed the Schpirkas that there were a large number of Ukrainians living in Canada and that the Province of Quebec was French speaking.

[24]    Before the Schpirkas decided to take steps to see whether they could immigrate to Canada, Ivan Serbyn informed his partners that he was immigrating to Canada and, as a result, sold them his interest in the business. Sometime in the spring of 1951, Mr. and Mrs. Schpirka took the Rohosky letter to the Canadian consulate to find out whether they could immigrate to Canada. The respondent does not remember much of the immigration process which led to his obtaining a visa. He does not remember being asked anything specific at the Canadian Consulate. He testified that he never filled out nor signed any form. He remembers seeing a doctor who asked that he have x-rays taken. He also remembers meeting an immigration officer with whom he spoke in French. The respondent stated categorically that he was never interviewed and that he attended the Consulate on two or three occasions. The respondent denies having been asked what he did between 1938 and 1945.

[25]    Within a matter of months, the Schpirkas obtained their Canadian visas. The Schpirkas boarded the ship NELLY at the port of Le Havre on August 6, 1951 and arrived in Quebec city on August 14, 1951. The following day, the Schpirkas proceeded to Montreal by train where they arrived at Windsor Station. The Schpirkas then took a taxi to the Rohosky residence situated in the Montreal district of Rosemont. According to the respondent, he did not see nor was he interviewed by immigration officers upon arrival in Quebec City.

[26]    Within a matter of weeks, Nicolas Schpirka had found a job. Initially, he attempted to find a job with Canada Packers but was refused because he could not speak English. Shortly thereafter he found a job with Frontenac Packing where he was paid $0.90 per hour. He worked 40 hours a week. He then found what he considered a well-paying job at $56.00 a week. He subsequently worked with Drash H. Kosher Meats and with Hygrade where he spent his days inside a freezer. Mr. Schpirka started having problems with his legs and his doctor advised him to leave his job at Hygrade if he "wanted to walk on his feet".

[27]    As a result, Mr. Schpirka decided to help his wife, a hairdresser, who had recently opened a beauty salon. Also, Mr. Schpirka began cultivating bees on a farm owned by one of his friends. When his friend sold the farm, Mr. Schpirka bought his own farm.

[28]    In Canada, Mr. Schpirka frequented the Church of St Sophie, an Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Montreal. In 1957, Mr. Schpirka confided in a priest that his real name was Katriuk and that he wanted to revert to his true name. The priest advised him to see a lawyer and suggested that he see Me Paul Massé, Q.C.. The priest took Schpirka to see Me Massé. After having related to Me Massé the events which led him to change his name, Mr. Schpirka asked Me Massé what could be done to enable him to change his name back to Katriuk. The respondent did not give Me Massé any information concerning his activities prior to his arrival in France in 1944.

[29]    Me Massé, after inquiring with the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (the "Department"), informed Nicolas Schpirka that the easiest way would be for him to apply to the Department for a name change before filing his application for Canadian citizenship.

[30]    On May 20, 1958, Vladimir Katriuk and his wife signed applications for citizenship under the name of Katriuk which the Department received on May 26, 1958. In his application, Mr. Katriuk stated that he was born in Luzhany, Romania (Ukraine), that he was a Romanian citizen and that his ethnic origin was Ukrainian. He further indicated that he had entered Canada under a false name, namely Nicolas Schpirka, and had arrived in Canada on August 14, 1951 on the steamship NELLY. He further indicated the following:

Avant la fin de la 2e guerre mondiale, j"ai quitté les rangs de la LÉGION ÉTRANGÈRE de France sous les nom et prénom "Nicolas Schpirka" Ref. le dossier ED-2-37194, Immigration, Montréal. Mes nom et prénom véritables sont "VLADIMIR KATRIUK".

[31]    On October 10, 1958, the registrar of Canadian Citizenship, Mr. J.E. Duggan, wrote to the Chief, Admission Division, Immigration Branch, in the following terms:

    Would you please advise this office of the details surrounding the correct names of Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk and, if possible, may we have a photo-copy [sic] of any documents on your file relating to their correct names.

[32]    On October 17, 1958, the following reply was sent to the registrar of Canadian Citizenship:

5.     The application of Vladimir Katriuk and his wife Maria Stephanie for amendment of our records, was favourably considered and due notation has been made to indicate that Vladimir Katriuk and Maria Katriuk were granted landing (admitted for permanent residence) at Quebec, P.Q. on August 14th, 1951.

[33]    The Department, by a letter dated May 13, 1958, advised Me Massé that Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk"s application to correct their names had been accepted. The letter reads as follows:

                    Port de Montréal

[34]    As appears from the above passage, the Department amended its records to indicate that Vladimir Katriuk and Maria Katriuk had been granted landing in Quebec City on August 14, 1951. As a result, Nicolas Schpirka and Maria Schpirka ceased to exist as far as the Department was concerned. This explains why Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk filed their applications for citizenship under their own names. On November 10, 1958, Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk became Canadian citizens.

[35]    I should point out here that Mr. Katriuk"s affidavit sworn to in Montreal on October 18, 1957, to which the Department"s reply of October 17, 1958 refers at paragraph 2, is not part of the evidence. I should also point out that Mr. and Mrs. Katriuk"s, or, rather, Mr. and Mrs. Schpirka"s, applications for permanent residence in Canada are also not in evidence since the files were destroyed by the Department in the regular course of its business at the end of the 1950s or early 1960s.

[36]    In these proceedings, the Attorney General, on behalf of the Minister, seeks a declaration from this Court that the respondent obtained his Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances. Specifically, in his summary of facts and evidence, the Attorney General submits the following:

53.     The Deputy Attorney General of Canada states that the Respondent obtained and retained Canadian citizenship by false representations or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances which gives the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration grounds upon which to make a report to the Governor in Council for the revocations of the Respondent"s citizenship.

[37]    It is therefore the Minister"s position that the respondent was a "collaborator", that he participated in the commission of atrocities against the civilian population in Byelorussia while a member of Battalion 118, that he failed to divulge material circumstances upon applying for permanent residence in Canada in 1951, including his true identity, and finally that he failed to divulge material circumstances in 1958 when he applied for Canadian citizenship. Before considering the Minister"s allegations, a few words must be said about the applicable law. These proceedings were commenced on October 31, 1996 and, as a result, the provisions of the Citizenship Act in force at that date govern the matter of the revocation of the respondent"s citizenship. In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Bogutin, (1998), 144 F.T.R. 1, McKeown J. carefully reviewed the relevant statutory sections and jurisprudence. In Bogutin, the respondent obtained a visa on June 27, 1951 and arrived in Canada on August 22, 1951. Following his application in 1958, he obtained his Canadian citizenship in 1959. Revocation proceedings were commenced against Mr. Bogutin by the Minister on April 4, 1996. Consequently, McKeown J."s review, with which I agree entirely, is applicable to the present matter. At pages 30 to 33 McKeown J. states:

[38]    Before dealing with the Minister"s allegations, I would like to say a few words on the standard of proof applicable in these proceedings. Once again, I am in complete agreement with the statement of the law made by Mr. Justice McKeown in Bogutin at pages 27 to 29:

[113] The Court in these proceedings is making findings of fact and making a report to the Minister. It does not follow that the Governor-in-Council is therefore compelled to revoke the citizenship of the respondent. The Minister has to consider a report and send it to the Governor-in-Council. The Governor-in-Council has to make a decision whether to revoke citizenship or not. Accordingly, I apply the civil standard of proof on a balance of probabilities but I must scrutinize the evidence with greater care because of the serious allegations to be established by the proof that is offered. [Emphasis added]

I now turn to the Minister"s allegations.

[39]    The respondent admits that he was a member of Battalion 115 and, subsequently, of Battalion 118. However, the respondent takes the position, and he testified to the effect that he did not voluntarily join the battalions. He testified that joining the battalions was the only alternative to deportation to Germany. In that regard, his evidence is corroborated by Ivan Serbyn and George Hiltschuk. Both Mr. Serbyn and Mr. Hiltschuk were Ukrainians from Bukovina who marched to Kiev in the fall of 1941 and both became members of Battalion 118. The respondent"s evidence that he did not voluntarily join Battalion 118 was also corroborated by the evidence of Mr. Savaliy Antonovich Khrenov, whose evidence I took in Nizhniy Novgorod, Russia, on March 30, 1998. Mr. Khrenov was a soldier in the Red Army. He had been called for military service in April 1941. He was part of the Soviet troops that were sent to occupy part of Poland. After Germany invaded Poland, Mr. Khrenov"s unit retreated to Kiev where, in November 1941, he was taken prisoner by the Germans. He was placed in a prisoners of war camp from which he escaped two months later. Although Mr. Khrenov was able to hide for a while, the Germans, on three occasions, tried to deport him to Germany. Each time, he managed to escape. This is what led him to join Battalion 118 in 1942. At one point during his cross-examination, when asked what alternative he had to joining Battalion 118, Mr. Khrenov gave the following answer:

The only faith that awaited me was a rope around the neck. That was the only choice left.²

[40]    On the issue of collaboration and war crimes, the Minister filed the expert reports of Professors Dr. Frank Golczewski and Dr. Manfred Messerschmidt. I will begin with the report of Dr. Golczewski. He received a Ph.D. from Cologne University in 1973 and subsequently studied extensively in the areas of modern and East-European history. From 1983 to 1994, he taught modern history and, since 1994, he has been a full professor of East-European history at the University of Hamburg.

[41]    In his report dated August 3, 1997, Dr. Golczewski discusses the organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Kiev under German occupation until December 1941, the Bukovina Battalion, the formation of local militias and auxiliary units in Bukovina, Galicia and Ukraine in the summer and fall of 1941 and the conditions for the auxiliary formations in occupied Russia.

[42]    At pages 29 to 31 of his report, Professor Golczewski writes as follows:

I know of no case where anybody would have been pressed into Schuma service. If the ?volunteerness? of the personnel is put into question it is only possible by taking into account the personal reference frame of the volunteers. Not joining the Schuma meant hunger and material dearth - on one level with the regular population. In contrast, for POWs only Schuma service meant escape from imminent death. This was balanced, however, by the clear understanding that a victorious Soviet Union would consider those who joined enemy para-military or military service to be traitors subject to the death penalty.

In light of the above I come to the conclusion

-     that service in the auxiliary units was voluntary. Only former POWs escaped imminent death by joining auxiliary units. For the others different incentives were a reason to make the choice they did,

-     that an oath of allegiance was not required for SSPF (Schuma) personnel before later in 1942,

-     that the auxiliaries were armed, though different waves of disarming then took place, and that the Bukovina Kure[frac12] is said to have started out unarmed.

[43]    At page 32 of his report, Professor Golczewski comments on the respondent"s statement in answer to the Minister"s summary of facts and evidence. Professor Golczewski writes:

As far as the paragraphs 4-8⁴ in the Respondent"s statement are concerned I state in the light of the above that the statements in paras 4 and 5 are correct. Para 5 is only half-true. Though the OUN set out to bring full independence to Ukraine it did so in cooperation with the Germans who were considered to be ?liberators? and allies. That is why many Ukrainian nationalists endorsed the German atrocities towards the Jewish and Polish populations, seeing in these activities a step towards ?ethnic cleansing? of the desired Ukrainian territory. This was done, because the Germans on purpose tried to foster a ?liberator"s? image. So although the sovereignty in the end was planned to be ?independent of both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany? the OUN groups were allied with the Germans: the OUN-B until July/August 1941, the OUN-M - to which the units, with which the respondent was affiliated, belonged - in Kiev until November/December 1941.

The Bukovinians arrived in Kiev in September or early October 1941. It is not clear if they arrived in Kiev right along with the German troops or some days later. Their later arrival would, however, not have been caused by the planting of mines, but by organizational priorities on the side of the OUN marching groups.

The statement of paras 8 and 9⁵ is correct in the light of the available documentation. There is some doubt about the statement in para 10⁶, as deportation for forced labour on a non-voluntary basis started only later in 1942. The reason given by Veryha (through only in the English summary) of his account is that the Bukovina men joined the 115^th Battalion, ?not having any means by which to return to their native province of Bukovina, occupied by Roumanians?. This was not the only solution - it was a more expedient one.

[44]    I now turn to Dr. Messerschmidt"s evidence. Dr. Messerschmidt received a Ph.D. from the University of Freiburg in 1954. In 1958, he obtained a law degree from that university and a second degree in law from Stuttgart University in 1962. Since 1962, he has been employed by the Research Institute for military history in Freiburg. In 1970, he became Chief Historian and has been teaching history since then at the University of Freiburg.

[45]    In his report, Dr. Messerschmidt discusses the formation of the Auxiliary Police (Schutzmannschaften) by the Germans. The Auxiliary Police, of which Battalions 115 and 118 formed part of, were to be used, according to Dr. Messerschmidt, primarily for security and anti-partisan warfare in the occupied regions.

[46]    According to Dr. Messerschmidt, as the Ukrainians were categorized as anti-Polish and pro-German, they were to be provided with more food and given preference in the staffing of subordinate administrative positions. Thus, according to Dr. Messerschmidt, the better treatment accorded to Ukrainians made it possible to establish "voluntary units" of Auxiliary Police.

[47]    At page 12 of his report, Dr. Messerschmidt poses the following question:

The question is whether there was force involved through coercion or the threat of deportation to forced labour in Germany.

[48]    Dr. Messerschmidt answers his question as follows:

    The forced recruitment for labour service in the Reich began only in 1942. Until then it was a matter of "attracting" people, although this was often done in a very drastic manner. Only in May of 1942, the Army High Command [OKH] demanded conditions for municipalities; through effective publicity measures by the mayors, the people should be made to understand what their duty was. However, residents were also pressed into service in the Army [Heer] Rear Area. Finally, the greatest number of forced labourers were recruited for service in the Reich in the summer of 1942, for the most part women who were employed in German households (about 800,000 Ukrainian women). These methods were continued in 1943. The "Reports from the Occupied Areas" ["Meldungen aus den besetzten Gebieten"], No. 54 of 14 May 1943) characteristically conclude: "In general it is found that no one can be motivated any longer to volunteer. However, since in certain places and areas, contingents for labourers were prescribed, one has no choice but to use force".

[49]    Later on, at page 14 of his report, he states:

The German side was aware that the prospect of a better life with the German troops was a major motive for prisoners of war. But this very circumstance shows that prisoners were not forced into collaborative service. This also would have run counter to the tendency of wanting only "reliable" prisoners.

[50]    With respect to the participation of Ukrainians in the Auxiliary Police, Dr. Messerschmidt opines as follows at pages 17 and 18 of his report:

In Ukraine, the General Commissar ordered a recruitment campaign for the auxiliary forces [Schutzmannschaften] on 24 February 1942. The following conditions were established for membership:

Special mention should be made of the Ukrainian units from which a large percentage of officers and men transferred into the Ukrainian Schuma battalions. From the German point of view, these legions that had been organized for an independent Ukraine, certainly represented an anti-Bolshevist potential which could be utilized for police purposes, provided that the primary nationalist interests could be repressed. This goal was not realized with all, but with very many it could be subordinated to the struggle against Bolshevism. It would be difficult to find another explanation for the fact that the transfer was generally achieved without many problems.

According to a memorandum by the Commander of the Order Police for Ostland of 13.3.1942, the recruitment of volunteers had the effect that skilled workers were leaving their jobs to join the auxiliaries [Schutzmannschaften]. In Latvia (according to Event Report [Ereignismeldung] USSR No. 187) 8000 volunteers had applied by 30 March 1942. Volunteers were also recruited for the Lithuanian auxiliaries [Schutzmannschaften].

The general rules also provided that members of the Schutzmannschaften could file an application for discharge.

[51]    After these comments, Dr. Messerschmidt then turns his attention to Schuma Battalions 115 and 118 and the respondent"s participation, on a voluntary basis, in these battalions. At pages 18 and 19, Dr. Messerschmidt writes the following:

Both battalions belonged to the area of Higher SS and Police Leader Russia South and Ukraine. For battalions in this area, the numbers 101 to 200 had been allocated.) It was thus determined that the bulk of the members were to be Ukrainians. The occupying power proceeded accordingly in Kiev when the battalions were set up.

The question is to what extent the prescribed volunteer principle was indeed maintained.

V. Katriuk (the Respondent will hitherto be referred to as R) has claimed that he was enlisted [eingestellt] after his arrival in Kiev (November or December 1941) and indicated that this was his only alternative, i.e. to deportation for slave labour in the Reich. He claims that soon after, Battalion 118 was formed from prisoners of war who also had the alternative to be brutally treated and to starve in the prisoner of war camp. The respondent says that he had been transferred with his company into Battalion 118. In this manner, he says, the Germans had tried to suppress the nationalist feelings of the Schutzmannschaften and that this was how they had treated the "volunteers". He says that an oath of solidarity had therefore not been requested either.

R. bases his claim that he did not join Battalion 115 voluntarily on two arguments:

He describes the overall situation as if Battalions 115 and 118 had been purely compulsory units [Zwangseinrichtungen].

The above indications concerning the German policy in terms of Ukrainian nationalism speak against R"s claim. Neither does the implication hold true that the Bukovina Ukrainians in November/early December 1941 were given the alternative of doing either forced labour in the Reich or police duty. Of the 15,000, only some entered the battalions. It cannot be determined whether the rest were taken to Germany. This is unlikely, because at that time there were no scheduled deportations to forced labour, and also because volunteer recruitment was still carried out in 1942.

This leads to the conclusion that the Higher SS and Police Leader [HSSPF] and the local authorities were supported by Ukrainian helpers in establishing the Schuma battalions in Kiev.

How can the Respondent"s comments be reconciled with these circumstances? Prior to the occupation of the Bukovina [Bukowina] by the USSR, R. was a Romanian citizen and a member of the Ukrainian minority. When the Wehrmacht ended the one-year Soviet rule in the summer of 1941, R. was barely 20 years old. As a non-Romanian and as a Ukrainian activist, he joined a volunteer unit whose aim was to act as a Ukrainian force to bring about an independent Ukraine. For that reason, this organization of Southwest Ukrainians marched for 3 months to Kiev, where upon its arrival in November/December 1941 it was housed in former barracks of the USSR security forces. The trident flag was unfurled, which the German side did not allow.

No one mentioned that the leading Ukrainian officers in Kiev were executed by the Germans, although questions about the instructors [Instrukteure] were raised during the interview [Vernehmung]. With this claim, R stands alone. Such action on the German side would be in contrast to the fact that the commander, the company heads [Kompaniechefs] as well as the platoon and group leaders [Zug - und Gruppenführer] in Battalion 118 were Ukrainians. In my opinion, R"s statements must be seen in connection with his position and role in the battalion. In contrast to the Ordnungsdienst unit (910 men) made up of Ukrainian prisoners of war released in Minsk, where the question of finding suitable Ukrainian leaders could not be solved, such complaints did not become known about Battalion 118. Obviously the German supervisory officers [Aufsichtsoffiziere] appointed by Decree [Erlaß] of Reichsführer SS [RFSS] of 6 November 1941 were fully satisfied with the performance and attitude of their Ukrainian comrades. R. was a Group Leader [Gruppenführer] in Platoon 1 [1.Zug] of Company 1 [1.Kompanie]. The company consisted primarily, or almost completely of Western Ukrainians. It was the best armed and can be described as the elite of the battalion. In his Group [Gruppe], R. was in charge of 10-12 men.

These indications do not fit into the picture of forced service which was painted by R. He does not mention at all that he served in Company 1 and that he was awarded a medal for his activities.

[52]    Then Dr. Messerschmidt addresses the field of operation of Battalion 118. He relates, in vivid terms, the participation of Battalion 118 in a number of important military operations, namely "Hornung", "Draufgänger ", "Cottbus", "Hermann" and "Wandsbeck" which took place between March and August 1943. For example, with respect to operation "Cottbus", Dr. Messerschmidt sets out, at page 23 of his report, figures taken from a German Combat Report of June 28, 1943 which highlights the success of that operation:

    Non-Germans:

[53]    Dr. Messerschmidt cites a report written by the General Commissar for White Ruthenia who complained that, during "Operation Cottbus", 13,000 enemies had been killed but only 950 rifles had been captured. The General Commissar would have then said:

"This ratio between enemy dead and weapons shows that 90% of the enemy dead were unarmed."

[54]    The figures which Dr. Messerschmidt gives for "Operation Hermann" are similar to those given for "Operation Cottbus" (4,280 enemies dead and 654 prisoners captured).

[55]    With respect to "Operation Wandsbeck", Dr. Messerschmidt pays particular attention to the destruction of the village of Khatyn on March 22, 1943. Dr. Messerschmidt explains the destruction of the village as follows:

There was a special reason why the village of Khatyn was destroyed on 22 March 1943. In the correspondence between German agencies, the events were dealt with under the heading "Ambush near Guba" ["Überfall bei Guba"]. First in the documents is a radio message from the SS Special Battalion Dirlewanger, dated 23.3.1943. In this message to the Plenipotentiary of the Reichsführer SS for Anti-Partisan Warfare (von dem Bach-Zelewski) it says that Battalion 118 had urgently requested support to be sent to Guba. Together with Battalion 118, the SS Company requested support to be sent to Guba. Together with Battalion 118, the SS Company [SS-Komp.] had pursued the retreating enemy to Chatyn. The village had been destroyed after fighting, and there had been 30 enemy dead. A completely different report went to the General Commissar in Minsk. According to this - letter of 1.4.43 to District Commissar [Gebietskommissar] Borossow - a security patrol from Battalion 118 had been ambushed near Guba, a captain and three Ukrainians were killed. In the pursuit, the gang [Bande] had been pinned down. 30 enemy dead. The partisan village ["Bandendorf"] of Chatyn with 90 inhabitants had been destroyed. On 10 April, the SS and Police Regional Leader [SS- und Pol.- Gebietsführer] requested a report from Battalion 118. On 12 April, the German commander of Battalion 118, Major Körner, reported to the SS and Police Regional Leader that the telephone line between Pleshchenice and Lahoysk had been interrupted on 22 March. To cover the repair team [Bautrupp], two platoons of Company 1, Battalion 118 had been dispatched. Behind Guba some woodcutters had been encountered who did not provide any information about partisans. Shortly after, the troops were ambushed. In the fighting, Captain Woellke and 3 auxiliary policemen [Schutzmänner] were killed. The enemy retreated to Chatyn. The woodcutters were apprehended. During an attempt to flee, 23 were killed, the rest were handed over to the Gendarmerie and finally released. The enemy was pinned down in the village of Chatyn, which was known to be in sympathy with the partisans ["partisanenfreundlich"]. In heavy fighting, 34 "bandits" and numerous villagers were killed: some died in the flames. Some of the inhabitants had probably left the village earlier so they would not be forced to side with the "bandits".

In addition to these operations, Battalion 118 or parts thereof participated in numerous patrols and security missions because the immediate vicinity of Pleshchenice and the surrounding area was insecure. The available documents mention at least 17 such operations in which Battalion 118 participated with forces of varying strength.

[56]    Finally, at page 27, as part of his conclusion, Dr. Messerschmidt writes:

In evaluating the operations of the Schuma battalions one has to consider that since their command in anti-partisan warfare was transferred to the Reichsführer SS [RFSS] and von dem Bach-Zalewski, the chief of anti-partisan warfare [Chef der Bandenbekämpfung] appointed by him, they were involved in a ruthless scenario of terror. This included the compulsory use of specific language. They had to speak of "gangs" ["Banden"]. Annihilation operations were called "pacification" or "re-establishment of security and order". Although the Foreign Armies Section (East) of the Army General Staff [Generalstab des Heeres] had made it clear that the enemy"s partisan operations were to be regarded as a tightly commanded means of warfare by the Red Army, and that since Marshall Voroshilov had taken command, partisans were seen as "soldiers of the Red Army in the rear of the enemy", the SS and police units in this particular Reich Commissariat, often supported by Wehrmacht security troops, continued their ruthless methods against the population. Members of the Schuma could avoid this only by deserting, which did happen and has been documented. R distanced himself only in France. In White Russia, he was described as an active Schuma man.

[57]    The picture painted by Dr. Messerschmidt is quite different from the story related by the respondent. It will be recalled that the respondent testified that his company had never participated in any major military operation. The respondent also testified that, in Pleshchenitsi and Evye, he had not fired his gun. Further, the respondent reiterated in his testimony what he stated in paragraphs 13, 17 and 18 of his statement in response to the Minister"s summary of facts and evidence. He added that, while in Minsk for three to four weeks, Battalion 118 underwent training exercises every day. The respondent related the same story in regard to Battalion 118"s presence in Pleshchenitsi, that the battalion underwent training exercises every day and that it guarded its barracks and a bridge on the main road. The battalion would have remained in Pleshchenitsi for two to three months and would never have left town.

[58]    In Evye, Battalion 118, according to the respondent, was housed in a school where the men were packed as "herrings in bunk-beds". Battalion 118 patrolled the town to show the population that it was there to protect them from the enemy.

[59]    I will now contrast the respondent"s testimony with that of Mr. Khrenov. Mr. Khrenov joined Battalion 118 in 1942. He was in the third platoon of the first company of Battalion 118. He remembers the respondent was a member of the first company. He also remembers that the respondent was from Western Ukraine. Mr. Khrenov confirmed the respondent"s testimony that, while in Kiev, Battalion 118 underwent training. He also remembered that the battalion had participated in an operation against partisans outside Chernigov. He added, however, that as things turned out, the first company had not been involved in the fighting.

[60]    Mr. Khrenov then testified that the battalion had been transferred to Minsk, either at the end of 1942 or the beginning of 1943. He testified that in Minsk, the battalion underwent training. He could not remember how long the battalion had remained in Minsk. He remembered that the battalion was transferred from Minsk to Pleshchenitsi some time in 1943. He remembered celebrating Christmas of 1942 in Pleshchenitsi. When asked in cross-examination whether his company had been involved in military action while in Pleshchenitsi, Mr. Khrenov answered "of course".

[61]    Mr. Khrenov explained that the first company "wasn"t always involved in things in its entirety. Sometimes, it would be involved as a platoon or as a unit". He then added that it was difficult to remember "all these things".

[62]    He testified that he had participated in the burning of the village of Chmelevisci. When asked whether the respondent had participated in this operation, he answered that he could not say but that he could say that the company "was there".

[63]    Mr. Khrenov also testified with respect to an incident which occurred on the road between Pleshchenitsi and Logoisk. A member of the battalion had been killed while repairing telephone lines. The first company was sent to the site of the incident. Mr. Khrenov stated that he saw dead bodies lying on the ground. Mr. Khrenov also saw woodcutters being escorted by the third platoon.

[64]    Mr. Khrenov remembers leaving the Pleshchenitsi region in the summer of 1943 "for some big operation". The battalion then went to Novogrudok. In the fall of 1943, the company went to Evye, where a number of operations were carried out. He remembers fighting partisans near the village of Morino. Mr. Khrenov remembers the respondent as being the Commander of the first unit of the first platoon of the first company. When asked how he would describe the way the respondent behaved during operations, Mr. Khrenov answered the following⁷:

A.     He was also given an award.

[65]    To complete Mr. Khrenov"s testimony, I should state that he was also part of the battalion created from the remains of Battalions 115 and 118 which was sent to France and from which a number of men defected to the FFL in 1944. In contrast to the respondent, Mr. Khrenov did not join the FFL and, as a result, returned to Russia. After being tried, he was found guilty of being a traitor to his country and was sentenced to be executed. After two months on "death row", Mr. Khrenov"s sentence was converted to twenty years of forced labour. After having served thirteen years in prison, Mr. Khrenov was released. He explained that Ukrainians from Eastern Ukraine were the ones that returned to Russia. The Western Ukrainians did not return. They remained in France.

[66]    In view of the evidence of Dr. Messerschmidt and Mr. Khrenov, I find it difficult, if not impossible, to accept the respondent"s evidence that he did not participate in any important military operation while his battalion was in Byelorussia. That is simply not plausible. I find that the respondent must have participated in at least some of the operations in which his battalion was involved between 1942 and 1944. The respondent was an active member of the battalion and was in charge of one unit of platoon number 1 of company 1. Mr. Khrenov remembers him as an "active participant". I can only conclude that the respondent, as a member of Battalion 118, took part in the operations in which his company was involved and, as a result, was certainly engaged in fighting enemy partisans.

[67]    Although I have no difficulty concluding that the respondent participated in the operations in which his company was involved, I am not prepared, on the evidence before me, to conclude that he participated in the commission of atrocities against the civilian population of Byelorussia. Not enough is known to reach any conclusion. The Minister did not call any witnesses, save Mr. Khrenov, with respect to the events on which Dr. Messerschmidt relies in coming to his conclusions. The Minister called Mr. Khrenov but his evidence does not support the Minister"s contention that the respondent committed atrocities or participated in the commission of atrocities against the civilian population of Byelorussia. Consequently, I am of the view that Dr. Messerschmidt"s expert evidence is not sufficient to support the conclusion which the Minister seeks. Dr. Messerschmidt is an expert historian. He relies, like Dr. Golczewski, on a number of documents in order to reach his conclusions. However, Dr. Messerschmidt, it goes without saying, has no personal knowledge of the events which he relates in his report. It would be unthinkable, in my view, to conclude, on the basis of Dr. Messerschmidt"s evidence only, that the respondent committed war crimes. I therefore find that the Minister has not proved, on a balance of probabilities, that the respondent participated in the commission of war crimes or that he committed such crimes. The Minister did not call any witnesses who could link the respondent to the atrocities committed against the civilian population.

[68]    I now turn to the issue of whether the respondent "voluntarily" joined Battalion 118. Both Drs. Golczewski and Messerschmidt are of the view that the respondent must have voluntarily joined Battalion 118. At page 31 of his report, Dr. Golczewski recognizes that refusal to join the Schuma could lead to "hunger and material dearth". He dismisses the respondent"s evidence that the only alternative to joining a battalion was deportation to Germany because "deportation or forced labour on a non-voluntary basis started only later in 1942". According to Dr. Golczewski, joining a battalion "was not the only solution. It was a more expedient one". Dr. Messerschmidt is, for slightly different reasons, also of the view that the respondent voluntarily joined Battalion 118.

[69]    As I indicated earlier, the respondent testified that joining a battalion was the only alternative to being deported to Germany. In that respect, I have already referred to the evidence of Messrs. Serbyn, Hilschuck and Khrenov.

[70]    This issue is not easy to decide. For those of us who did not participate in the Second World War, or for that matter in any war, it is almost impossible to imagine the difficult choices men and women had to make during the course of that war. In the circumstances which prevailed at that time, "voluntary service" may well have been a relative term. As Professor Golczewski himself recognizes, there were many reasons why a man could have decided to join a battalion. To name a few, deportation, hunger, possible death, etc.. It must be remembered that Professor Golczewski"s opinion is all encompassing. All those who joined the battalions, save for prisoners of war like Mr. Khrenov, did so voluntarily. That cannot, in my view, possibly be true. No doubt many men did join the battalions of their own free will. It cannot also be doubted that many did not join of their own free will but did so either to avoid deportation, hunger or perhaps death. When asked by counsel for the Attorney General why he did not leave Battalion 118, the respondent answered by saying "where could we go? To the Red Partisans, or maybe to the Polish Partisans?".

[71]    It is interesting to compare the statements made by Drs. Golczewski and Messerschmidt with those that are made by Professor Subtelny in his book Ukraine A History. At pages 471 to 473, under the heading Collaboration, Professor Subtelny writes:

Collaboration     In dealing with the Nazis, the Ukrainians had two alternatives: to obey or to resist. As throughout all of German-occupied Europe, the vast majority chose obedience. And when obedience went beyond the limits of the passive fulfillment of German commands, it usually became collaboration. In Western Europe, where loyalty to one"s state was taken for granted and the Nazis were the one and only enemy, collaboration with the Germans was generally viewed as a form of treason. But in Ukraine, collaboration was a much more complicated issue. It was, first of all, unclear as to how much loyalty Ukrainians owed to Stalin"s regime or to the Polish state that had mistreated them. Who was the primary enemy? Was it the Stalinist system, which inflicted such great suffering in the 1930s, or the Nazi regime, which was currently (but perhaps only temporarily) in power? Finally, given the extreme ruthlessness of both regimes in Ukraine, collaboration was often the price of survival for many Ukrainians.

    For Ukrainians the was posed the problem of how to make the best of what was essentially a no-win situation. From an average individual"s point of view, success generally meant the preservation of one"s life. For Ukrainian leaders and their organizations in German-occupied territories the goal - or rather, the puzzle - was how to preserve Ukrainian interests from both the Nazis and the increasingly stronger Soviets. Distasteful as it was, some Ukrainian leaders decided to side with one totalitarian system in order to withstand the other. Because the Soviets appeared to be the greater long-term threat, almost all Ukrainian organizations in the Third Reich collaborated with the Germans at one time or another, but always to a limited degree and for strictly tactical reasons. As a people without a state of their own, Ukrainians operated from a position of weakness. They were unable to formulate policy or influence events. Consequently, Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis was insignificant compared to that of Germany"s allies. Finally, although there were opportunists, anti-Semites, and ideological fanatics among the Ukrainians, there is no evidence indicating that their number was proportionally greater than among other nationalities.

    On the individual level, collaboration with the Germans usually took the form of participation in the local administration of the German-supervised auxiliary police. Motives for taking such positions varied. In Western Ukraine, where, before the war, Poles had excluded Ukrainians from even the lowest administrative positions, the desire to have at least a minimum of authority in Ukrainian hands and to turn the tables on hated rivals was often a major motive. The need to find employment or to satisfy personal ambitions was, as always, an important consideration. The most notorious form of collaboration was to act as a concentration camp guard. Invariably, guard positions were held by Soviet prisoners of war, who had the difficult choice of accepting the task or perishing in the camps.

    Given the lowly position of Ukrainian collaborators in the Nazi apparatus and the ss monopoly on the actual extermination of Jews, Ukrainian participation in the massacres was neither extensive nor decisive. When it did occur, it usually took the form of auxiliary policemen herding Jews into ghettos. However, there were also many Ukrainians who risked the death penalty by aiding Jews. Metropolitan Sheptytsky was an outstanding example: not only did he shelter hundreds of Jews in monasteries but he also used his sermons to decry the Nazi slaughter of Jews. In 1943 an ss report to Himmler stated that the metropolitan was adamantly opposed to the Nazi anti-Semitic outrages and that he had come to consider nazism to be an even greater evil than communism.

    Aside from the abortive interlude between the OUN and the Germans in the early days of the war, the most important case of Ukrainian cooperation with Hitler"s regime on the organizational level was the formation of the ss volunteer Galicia Division. In spring 1943, after the stunning German defeat at Stalingrad, Nazi authorities belatedly decided to recruit non-German "easterners" into their forces. Consequently, Otto Wächter, the governor of Galicia, approached the Ukrainian General Committee (UCC) with a proposal to form a Ukrainian division in the German army. After much debate and despite opposition from the OUN-B, Kubijovy… and his associates agreed. Their immediate reason for the creation of such a division was the hope that it might help to improve German treatment of the Ukrainians. The specter of 1917-20 was also extremely influential in persuading the UCC leadership, for Kubijovy… and his associates (as well as Metropolitan Sheptytsky himself) were convinced that it was the lack of a well-trained army that had prevented Ukrainians from establishing their own state after the First World War. Realizing that the defeat of Germany was probable, they were determined that this time Ukrainians would not be caught in the ensuing chaos without a regular military force. It should be emphasized that both the Ukrainian organizers of the division and its members were motivated primarily by patriotic and anti-Soviet motives, not by pro-Nazi sympathies.

    In the negotiations leading up to the formation of the division, the UCC insisted that the unit fight only against the Soviets. Wächter, on Himmler"s instructions, demanded that the entire higher divisional command be German and, in order not to irritate Hitler, that the division be called Galician rather than Ukrainian. When the UCC called for volunteers in June 1943, over 83,000 men responded. Of these, 13,000 eventually became members of the ss Volunteer Galicia Division.

    The men of the Galician Division were not the only Ukrainians in Hitler"s armies. Scattered among the approximately 1 million former Soviet citizens who wore German uniforms in 1944 were about 220,000 Ukrainians (most of the others were Russians). To put these numbers into perspective, it should be remembered that about 2 million Ukrainians fought on the Soviet side and that large numbers also fought in Polish, Romanian, Hungarian, Czech, American, and Canadian forces. Such was the fate of a stateless people.

[72]    There is no evidence that the respondent, prior to August of 1944, made any attempt to leave Battalion 118. This, in any event, would be most surprising since leaving the battalion might have been considered to be desertion and would perhaps have resulted in the firing squad. On the other hand, a man could leave to join the partisans and fight against Germany which, in the end, is what the respondent did in August of 1944 when he and others joined the FFI.

[73]    On the evidence before me, I cannot accept the respondent"s evidence that refusal to join Battalions 115 and 118 necessarily meant deportation or forced labour. Rather, I am of the view that the respondent joined the battalions for a number of reasons, possibly including better living conditions and avoiding hunger. Another possible reason for joining a battalion was that Ukrainians, at least for a short period of time, preferred the Germans to the Russians and were prepared to fight against their former oppressors. In the end, I must agree with Dr. Golczewski that the respondent decided that joining a battalion was the lesser evil of the choices that life was offering him at that time. In reaching this conclusion, I wish to make it clear that I do not believe that the respondent was entirely candid in relating his participation in Battalion 118. He clearly was not prepared to answer fully the questions put to him regarding his participation in Battalion 118 and, more particularly, in company number 1 of that battalion. In my view, he was only prepared to testify with respect to generalities and not to specifics. This does not, however, lead me to infer that the respondent was trying to conceal that he had committed or participated in the Commission of war crimes. As I indicated earlier, the Minister did not adduce any evidence, other than that of the expert historians, to prove its allegation that the respondent had committed war crimes. In reaching that conclusion, I am perfectly conscious of the fact that the victorious powers, which include Canada, are the ones that decided what collaboration meant and who collaborators were. For reasons which will appear later on, this finding is not, in any event, determinative of the questions which I must answer.

[74]    It is not disputed that the respondent misrepresented his identity when he applied for a visa in Paris in 1951. Consequently, the respondent concealed material circumstances when applying for permanent residence in Canada. However, by reason of his application in 1957 to have his name changed from Schpirka to Katriuk, it does not necessarily follow that the respondent obtained his Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances.

[75]    On this issue, the Minister"s position is that there was in existence in 1951 a system which provided for screening of immigrants based on the information which they provided in their application forms and, in particular, information regarding their residences and employments from 1938 until the date of their applications. The Minister submits that this system could only be effective if applicants provided accurate and truthful information regarding their identity and their history, as requested in the application form and reviewed during a visa-vetting interview.

[76]    The Minister submits that, when the applicant applied to come to Canada in 1951, persons found to be collaborators were not admissible. According to the Minister, there was a blanket exclusion in regard to "collaborators".

[77]    I will now briefly review Canada"s immigration policy⁸ concerning the entry into Canada of "undesirable" persons and the manner in which the government chose to implement its policy.

[78]    By the end of the Second World War, Canada"s immigration policy was still subject to an order in council⁹ adopted in 1931 pursuant to the Immigration Act, R.S. 1927, c. 93 (the "Immigration Act, 1927"). As a result, it was quite difficult, if not impossible, for immigrants from countries other than the United Kingdom, the United States, Ireland and the Dominions to come to Canada as permanent residents. There were up to six hundred thousand displaced persons at the end of the war. Thus, Canada was not in a position to accept the large-scale immigration which resulted from the war.

[79]    From 1945 to 1947, Cabinet held many discussions with a view to "relaxing" the provisions of the 1931 order in council. In October 1945, an order in council¹⁰ was passed so as to allow refugees who had entered Canada during the war to obtain landed status. In January 1947, Cabinet decided that a number of statutes would either be repealed or amended to end racial discrimination, particularly as concerned persons of Asian origin.

[80]    On May 1, 1947, the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Mackenzie King, made the following statement in the House of Commons:

    The policy of the government is to foster the growth of the population of Canada by the encouragement of immigration. The government will seek by legislation, by regulation, and vigorous administration, to ensure the careful selection and permanent settlement of such numbers of immigrants as can advantageously be absorbed in our national economy.

    ...

    Because of the limitation of transport, the government decided that, as respects immigration from Europe, the emphasis for the present should be on the admission of the relatives of persons who are already in Canada, and on assisting in the resettlement of displaced persons and refugees.

    ...

    The government is sending immigration officers to examine the situation among the refugee groups, and to take steps looking towards the early admission of some thousands of their number. In developing this group movement, the immigration branch and the Department of Labour will determine jointly the approximate number of persons who can be readily placed in employment and absorbed into various industries and occupations. Selection officers will then consider applicants for entry into Canada, examine them on a basis for suitability and physical fitness, and make arrangements for their orderly movement and placement. Persons so admitted will, of course, be included in whatever quota Canada finally accepts as its share in meeting the general problem. In taking these steps the government is seeking to ensure that the displaced persons admitted to Canada are of a type likely to make good citizens.

    ...

    Let me now speak of the government"s long term programme. It is based on the conviction that Canada needs population. The government is strongly of the view that our immigration policy should be devised in a positive sense, with the definite objective, as I have already stated, of enlarging the population of the country. This it will seeks [sic ] to attain through the development and energetic application of productive immigration measures.

    ...

    The population of Can